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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
INTRODUCTION 
 David O. Jones (“David”) and his son, David Bryce Jones (“Bryce”), always 
had a close relationship, and they formed multiple businesses together over the 
years.  Bryce wanted nothing more than for those businesses to be profitable for 
his father.  Unfortunately, their most recent venture—a restaurant—was not 
successful, despite Bryce working full time to make it work while also caring for 
his father.  While Bryce worked to open the restaurant, David became unable to 
care for himself, so Bryce moved him to an assisted living facility.  During that 
time, following his father’s wishes and an assurance from the assisted living 
facility that he could defer payments, Bryce took out loans from David to try to 
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salvage the business.  In doing so, he did not knowingly misuse his father’s assets 
or put his father at risk.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
objecting to improper expert testimony by lay witnesses, and not objecting to 
improper other acts evidence, and in stipulating to erroneous jury instructions,?   
Standard of Review.  Ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law.  
See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.  To the extent any of these 
issues were not invited error, they may also be reviewed for plain error. 
 Preservation.  Ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
2.   Is the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally 
vague?  
Standard of Review.  “A statute's constitutionality is a question of law” 
reviewed “for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.”  State v. 
Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 29, 870 Utah Adv. Rep. 29. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved by written and oral argument.  
R174-184, R282-300, R304-311, R950-960.  
3. Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to send the case 
to the jury? 
Standard of Review. The Court gives deference to the jury’s verdict and 
will reverse for insufficient evidence only if it determines that “‘reasonable minds 
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could not have reached the verdict.’” State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 29, 122 
P.3d 639 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, P 74, 28 P.3d 1278). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved at R753, 957-58.  To the extent that 
it was not preserved, the issue may be reviewed for ineffective assistance of 
counsel and plain error.  See, e.g., State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 17, 10 P.3d 
346. 
4. Was it ineffective assistance of counsel to not seek to merge Bryce’s 
convictions where he was convicted of two crimes for just one act? 
Standard of Review.  “If trial counsel fails to request the consolidation of 
charges under the merger doctrine, and consolidation would be in order, trial 
counsel has failed to provide effective assistance of counsel.”   State v. Perez-
Avila, 2006 UT App 71, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 864. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A:  
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402;  
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513;1 
Utah R. Evid. 404; 
Utah R. Evid. 701; 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
 
                                               
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Utah Code are to LexisNexis, 
Lexis Advance through the 2018 Second Special Session. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts. 
David Bryce Jones (“Bryce”) and his father David Jones (“David”) had a 
close relationship.  R802.  Bryce is an only child and is devoted to his father. 
R787-88, R802, 806.  Bryce “loved his dad.  He wanted to make him proud.”  
R787, 788.   
Bryce wanted to make sure David was well cared for.  R785.  Although 
David had eight siblings, he was not very close to them, seeing them only once a 
year or so at family gatherings.  R599, 803.  David had lost two wives to 
dementia. R802-803.  After David second wife died, Bryce became his main 
companion.  R802-803.   
Bryce lived in Salt Lake City and would visit his father who lived in St. 
George every month.  R609, 804.  The two also travelled together often.  R802-
803. Over the years, David freely gave money to Bryce and partnered with his son 
in several businesses.  R804, R811. David “was always looking for the big score.” 
R811.   
 In 2010, David—who was then 86-years-old and worried that he may 
develop dementia—executed a general durable power of attorney that named 
Bryce as his agent.  R806; State’s Ex. 24.  Around that time, David and Bryce 
decided open a restaurant together.  R806.  The two formed an LLC and they 
eventually found a location in Sugarhouse for a neighborhood pub and restaurant 
they called “Brewhaha.”  R806.  Although David had started to show early signs 
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of dementia sometime in 2011, he was still living independently in St. George.  
R808.   He would travel to Salt Lake to check on the progress in getting the 
restaurant going.  R769, R784-85, 809.  He went shopping, attended biweekly 
temple sessions, and cooked and cleaned for himself.  R813.  In addition to 
investing in the business, David gave Bryce money for his living expenses so that 
Bryce could dedicate all his time to the restaurant.  R811.   
For much of 2013, Bryce was working full-time trying to get Brewhaha 
open and operational. R810-811.  David would visit to check on the progress. 
R769, 809.  Mike Davis spoke with David “on numerous occasions” in 2013 while 
helping to remodel the restaurant, and also a couple times at Bryce’s house when 
he had dinner there.  R768-69.  David would visit the construction site and would 
inquire about work being done.2  R769-70, 774-75.   Mr. Davis testified that David 
was “coherent and lucid.”  R770.  Robert Eagle also met David five to ten times 
while helping remodel the restaurant.  R777-78.  David was “supportive” of the 
project and seemed “just fine” cognitively. R778.  John Ross, an investor in 
Brewhaha, spoke with David occasionally in fall 2013.  R756-57.  Mr. Ross 
testified that David seemed coherent and interested in the restaurant.  R756-57.  
Tiffany Holcomb, Bryce’s friend who helped at Brewhaha before and after it 
opened, saw David at the restaurant “[a]bout half a dozen times,” including once 
                                               
2 Although Mr. Davis’ testimony did not provide an exact time frame he appeared 
to be referring to David visiting the site in 2013, both before and after he moved 
to Salt Lake.  See R769-70, 774-75, 809. 
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before he moved up from St. George. R784-85.   She also visited David at 
Highland Cove.  R784.   
In late September 2013, after driving home from a vacation, David became 
severely dehydrated and disoriented.  R812.   David was checked into the 
emergency room and Bryce immediately went to see him.  R812.  After that 
incident, David was no longer able to live independently. R813.  Bryce made 
arrangements for David to move to Highland Cove, an assisted living facility in 
Salt Lake County.  R813. He was checked in at “level A,” the least amount of care 
for residents, which included medication management, and other living 
assistance as needed.  R525-26.  After moving to Highland Cove, David remained 
very interested in Brewhaha, and Bryce would take him on visits to the site. 
R769-70, 774-75, 756-57, 784-85, 809, 815-816.   
Brewhaha opened in mid-December, 2013, but although the DABC had 
previously told Bryce that the restaurant would receive a liquor license on 
Tuesday, December 16, 2013, the board instead voted to postpone the approval 
for three months.  R817.  The partners knew that without a liquor license, the 
restaurant would almost certainly fail and had to decide whether to move 
forward.  R817-818.  In a final effort to salvage the business, Bryce spoke with 
Cody Tower, Highland Cove’s general manager, who agreed to allow David to 
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defer his approximately $3,000.00 monthly payments.3  R818.  But in March, the 
liquor license was again denied.  R819. During this time, Bryce updated Mr. 
Tower on the business and finances every month.  R546, 825.  Bryce spoke with 
Mr. Tower on May 1, 2014 “per schedule.” R820.  On May 23, 2014, Highland 
Cove sent Bryce an eviction notice. R521, 544, 820; State’s Ex. 4.   
Bryce was surprised because of his arrangement with Mr. Tower.  R820-21.  
He asked if starting to make payments would cancel the eviction, and was told 
“yes.” R820-21.  Bryce contacted Mr. Tower and made a $3,000 payment.  R521, 
820-21; State’s Ex. 3.  He also looked into other arrangements in case his father 
needed to be moved, which included daily care by certified nurse assistants.  
R786, 823.  However, when Bryce told Mr. Tower that he could move David out, 
Mr. Tower said there would be no need to do that because Highland Cove work 
with him on the arrearages.  R824.     
In July 2014, the partners moved Brewhaha to a new location and changed 
the name to Gusto. R822.  However, Bryce was ultimately unable to save the 
business or his father’s investment; Gusto closed in early 2015.  R826.  Before 
then, Bryce had started to make regular payments.  R826.   
Bryce’s actions were based on his understanding that his father wanted the 
business to succeed and that Highland Cove was willing to work with him on the 
                                               
3 Mr. Tower testified that although he recalled speaking to Bryce about the bills 
and the business, he did not recall any agreement to defer payments.  R541-42, 
546, 553.  
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arrearages.  R819, 826.  It was also based on his understanding that David had 
authorized him, in the power of attorney, to manage his finances, and that David 
approved of his actions.  R828, 844; State’s Ex. 24.   
A public guardian was appointed in October 2014.  R567.  Bryce provided 
the guardian with David’s financial information.  R570.  Bryce unsuccessfully 
tried to get the guardian to pay certain bills and the guardian refused. R571-72, 
575-76, 828.  David told Bryce that he wanted him to remain in control.  R828.  
For that reason, Bryce attempted to regain control of David’s finances to ensure 
his bills were paid.  R828.   The State presented no evidence that David’s 
standard of living actually suffered.  David’s bills were brought current and he 
continued to live at Highland Cove. R969. B    
B. Summary of Procedings.   
On December 5, 2015, David was charged with two counts of abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, and two counts of unlawful dealing 
of property by a fiduciary, all second degree felonies from October 31, 2013—the 
date David checked into Highland Cove—to October 31, 2014.  R1-5.  The 
information was amended to one count of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult, and one count of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, 




Motion to Dismiss. Before trial, trial counsel moved to have the charge 
dismissed on the basis that Section 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) was unconstitutionally 
vague.  R174-184.  See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii) (“A person commits 
the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult when the person: unjustly or 
improperly uses or manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or 
advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult.”).  Trial counsel argued 
that, like a similar Florida law declared unconstitutional, Utah’s use of the words 
“unjustly or improperly” to describe prohibited conduct was too vague to give 
defendants notice. R175-83; R304-311.  The trial court deferred ruling on that 
motion until after trial. R324; R950-960.  After trial, the State argued that Bryce 
could not show the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.  
R282-300.  The trial court ruled that the statute was constitutional “under the 
facts and circumstances of this case” as applied to Bryce and facially. R959.   
Expert Testimony.  The State provided notice of just one expert 
witness—Perrine Anderson, a nurse practitioner, who the State expected to testify 
to David’s treatment plan and mental health.  R152-56.  Two of the State’s lay 
witnesses—Kimberly Mack and Cory Tower—also provided expert testimony to 
that effect at trial.  R152-56.  Mr. Tower’s testimony came after the trial court 
instructed him that he could only testify as to his personal knowledge.  R534.  
Trial counsel objected to Mr. Tower’s opinion testimony but withdrew that 
objection based on his psychology degree.  R538-39.  No objection was raised to 
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Ms. Mack’s opinion testimony as to David’s mental capacity, including on dates 
on which she did not observe him, which was based on her training and 
experience.  R668, 678-79, 682-83. 
404(b) Evidence.  The State did not provide Bryce notice of any 404(b) 
evidence.  R41.  Although the probable cause statement and preliminary hearing 
did not mention it, the State planned to introduce evidence that Bryce spent 
$20,000 on his father’s credit card in fall 2014 and other evidence. R374.  Before 
trial, counsel argued that the information alleged “only the non-payment of 
money to the assisted living home” and other evidence of where Bryce used the 
money should be excluded because the State failed to provide the requisite Rule 
404(b) notice.  R365-66.   The State argued that none of the evidence related to 
the charged conduct from October 31, 2013 to February 1, 2015 was 404(b) 
evidence.  R169-70, R367.  The trial court ruled that the State would be limited to 
evidence within the scope of discovery and the amended information:  
“Anything that was not turned over in discovery is not going to be 
admissible.… If it’s relevant to what’s charged in the information, 
then it’s admissible.  If it is … evidence of other bad acts outside the 
scope of what’s charged in the information, then I will hear an 
argument that it’s not admissible because you didn’t give the 404(b) 
notice that you were required to do because the defense asked for it 
and they were entitled to it.”  
 
R375 (emphasis added).  During trial, the State introduced two key pieces of 
evidence of Bryce’s conduct that feel outside the scope of what was charged in the 
information.   
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First, the State introduced evidence from an eviction proceeding in which 
Bryce asserted that David lacked capacity to sign a lease in March 2013—roughly 
six months before the charged conduct occured. R735-38; State’s Ex. 23.  Bryce 
and David both signed the lease for the building where Brewhaha would be 
located.  State’s Ex. 23.  To protect David from the eviction proceeding, Bryce 
took David’s name off of the LLC, and asserted that David was not a proper 
defendant because he lacked capacity to sign the lease.  R735-38, 807-08. 
Although David’s signature was required on the lease, he was not an owner of the 
LLC that was formed to rent the building. R735-38, 838. 
 The State used this evidence of a prior act to assert in opening and closing 
arguments that Bryce was dishonest:  “The judge has instructed you.  If he lies on 
one occasion … whether he’s competent or incompetent six months later, you can 
disregard all of his testimony.” R877; R501-502.  The State also used the lease to 
argue that Bryce knew he was not acting in David’s best interest: “Was he really 
looking out for his dad’s interest when he had his dad sign the lease and was he 
competent? …. Having his father sign the Brewhaha lease, which is described as a 
horrible lease.”  R877-879.    
 Next, trial counsel stipulated to the State’s introduction of unauthenticated 
hearsay evidence of a ledger sheet titled “Loans to David Bryce Jones” 
purportedly denoting loans made from 1998 to 2000 but no payments made on 
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Mr. Jones was tried by a jury on June 27 and June 28, 2017.  He was 
convicted of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult and of unlawful 
dealing of property by a fiduciary, both second degree felonies. R252-253, R265.  
He was sentenced on September 14, 2018. R324-26.  He timely appealed. R328.4 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.  Trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to object to improper expert opinion testimony by lay 
witness, 404(b) evidence that was introduced despite the trial court’s pretrial 
ruling, and in stipulating to a jury instruction that lowered the State’s burden of 
proof.  Individually, or collectively, these objectively unreasonable actions by trial 
counsel prejudiced Bryce by allowing the State to unfairly bolster its case with 
evidence that played up David’s incapacity, while strongly suggesting that Bryce 
was dishonest and had a propensity to take out loans without paying them back. 
It also allowed the State to lessen its burden of proof from knowing to reckless on 
the element of Bryce’s awareness of the purported substantial risk of loss. 
                                               




 Unconstitutionally Vague Statute.  The trial court erred in its ruling 
that the exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
on its face or as applied to Bryce.  The statute uses the vague terms “improper” 
and “unjust” to define when it is illegal to use a vulnerable adult’s resources for 
someone other than a vulnerable adult.  Because of the subjective meaning of 
those terms, the statute provides virtually no notice of what conduct might be 
barred.  It also did not fairly apprise Bryce of what conduct of his the State 
considered to be unjust or improper. 
 Insufficient Evidence.   Bryce also believes the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him because he did not know that he breached his duty to David or 
otherwise managed his resources unjustly or improperly, or that he knew of a 
substantial risk of loss. 
 Merger.  Bryce’s two convictions should merge because he was convicted 
of two second degree felonies for just one crime.  The only evidence presented to 
the jury supported just one conviction and the State did not argue that there were 




I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUIONALLY 
INEFFECTIVE  
 “The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution” guarantees the 
accused “‘the right to effective assistance of counsel.’”  State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
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182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 
(1970) (additional citation omitted).  A defendant’s right to effective assistance is 
denied when counsel’s performance falls “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” and there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).  “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” 
when considering the “totality of the evidence [and] taking into account such 
factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record.”  Id. at 
694-96.  It does not require a defendant to show that counsel’s deficient 
representation “more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Rather, the standard is met if counsel’s ineffective 
assistance can render the proceeding “unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself 
unfair.” Id. at 694.   
“‘An error is prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the 
law.’” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 41, 274 P.3d 992 (quoting State v. 
Penn, 2004 UT App 212, ¶ 28, 94 P.3d 308).  “A court must ‘consider the totality 
of the evidence before the judge or jury’ and then ‘ask if the defendant has met 
the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have 
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been different absent the errors.’” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at at 695-96).   
Bryce received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and was prejudiced 
as a result.  His trial counsel stipulated to erroneous jury instructions, failed to 
object to the admission of other acts evidence despite a pre-trial ruling that it 
would be excluded, and did not object to two expert testimony by two State lay 
witnesses.  
A. It was ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error to not 
object to the expert testimony of Kimberly Mack and Cody 
Tower. 
A lay witness may only give an opinion if it is “rationally based on the 
witness's perception;” “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony 
or to determining a fact in issue;” and “not based on scientific, technical, other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”  Utah R. Evid. 701.  It is 
well-settled that if “testimony, ‘opinion or otherwise,’ is based on ‘scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge,’ it is within the scope of rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and may not be admitted as lay fact testimony.”  State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 20, 147 P.3d 1176 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702); 
accord Ladd v. Bowers Trucking, Inc., 2011 UT App 355, ¶ 13, 264 P.3d 752 
(“Lay witnesses can testify only to matters of which they have personal 
knowledge.”). The State must give defendant notice of expert testimony.  See 
Utah Code Ann  § 77-17-13(1).   Failure to do so, entitles the defendant to a 
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continuance, or appropriate sanctions including excluding the testimony “if a 
party deliberately violated” the notice requirement.  Id. § 77-17-13(5).  Generally 
speaking, expert testimony is not admissible unless the proponent can show that 
it “will assist the trier of fact and that the expert is qualified in the methods 
employed,” and that “the principles or methods employed are reliable, have been 
reliably applied, and are based upon sufficient facts or data.”  State v. 
Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 35, 318 P.3d 1221 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702; Haupt 
v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ¶ 25, 131 P. 3d 252).  
The State gave Bryce pretrial notice as to only one expert witness, Perrine 
Anderson, a nurse practitioner, who the State expected to testify to David’s 
treatment plan and mental health.  R152-56.  Yet, at trial, the State also 
introduced expert opinion testimony as to David’s mental capacity through two 
lay witnesses—Kimberly Mack and Cory Tower.  Trial counsel unreasonably 
failed to hold the state to its burden “to establish that the testimony will assist the 
trier of fact and that the expert is qualified in the methods employed.”  
Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 35.   
 This improper use of lay witnesses to provide expert opinion testimony 
improperly bolstered the State’s position that David lacked the mental capacity to 
agree to fund the restaurant or knowingly sign documents, and was harmful to 
Bryce because it tended to discredit Bryce and other witnesses who based on their 
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own observations believed David to be engaged and supportive of Bryce and the 
restaurant.5 
1. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to Kimberly Mack’s 
improper opinion testimony. 
 
The State called Kimberly Mack, a social worker for Adult Protective 
Services, to testify as a lay witness.  Ms. Mack met David Jones only once, on 
September 26, 2014, and conducted a cognitive assessment.  R668, 686.  Based 
on that one meeting, Ms. Mack testified that David had “significant memory 
impairment.”  R668.  Despite having only met David once, Ms. Mack also 
testified that, based on her experience, David “did not have the capacity” to sign a 
letter authorizing Bryce to take out loans on November 26, 2013—nearly a year 
before she met him.  R678-79.  She also testified that David lacked capacity to 
sign a document on January 9, 2015.  R682-83. 
Ms. Mack’s opinion as to the results of David’s cognitive test were almost 
certainly based on her specialized training.  Moreover, her opinions as to David’s 
capacity on two occasions when she did not see him are not reasonably based on 
her own personal observations, but was by her own admission based on her 
knowledge and experience in her field.  R678-79.    
As stated, lay witnesses cannot give opinions that are not based on their 
personal observations.  See Utah R. Evid. 701 (requiring lay witness opinion 
                                               
5 The transcripts relevant to this argument are reproduced in Addendum C. 
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testimony to be “rationally based on the witness’s perception”); State v. Sellers, 
2011 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 248 P.3d 70 (lay witness’s testimony as to defendant’s level 
of intoxication on a certain date was improper because it was “not based on her 
own personal observation of him”); State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, ¶ 
26 n. 5.   
It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object to this 
testimony, first because failing to hold the State to its burden in introducing 
expert testimony was a failure “to make reasonable investigation or inquiry.”  
Thompson 2014 UT App 14, ¶¶ 36-37 (objectively unreasonable to not inquire 
into expert’s qualifications or report foundation where testimony hurt 
defendant’s case).  And, “the failure to object to inadmissible evidence may 
constitute deficient performance under some circumstances.” Id. ¶ 36; accord 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶¶ 24, 33, 247 P.3d 344 (objectively unreasonable to not 
object to introduction of portions of victim impact statement at capital 
sentencing hearing).  Here, trial counsel’s failure to object to Ms. Mack’s 
unqualified expert opinion testimony cannot be said to be a reasonable strategic 
decision because the testimony bolstered the State’s position that David was 
incompetent while offering additional testimony that tended to discredit Bryce’s 
testimony that David wanted to invest in the restaurant.  Moreover, “trial counsel 
was not in a position to weigh the relative risks of objecting against the need to 
object without at least investigating whether [Ms. Mack] was qualified and 
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whether there was adequate foundation for” her opinion as to David’s capacity. 
See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 42 (citing State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶ 83, 
152 P.3d 321; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003)).6 
2. It was objectively unreasonable to stipulate to Cody Tower’s 
improper opinion testimony. 
 
Likewise, there was no reasonable strategic reason to concede to Cody 
Tower’s expert opinion testimony as to David’s ability to understand a document 
in which he gave Bryce permission to take out loans simply because had 
“psychology training.”7  R561-62.  Like Ms. Mack, Mr. Tower’s was listed as a lay 
witness, and his preliminary hearing testimony focused solely on the financial 
evidence, providing Bryce with no notice that he could be called as an expert.    
                                               
6 The failure by the trial court to intervene constituted plain error, which 
requires showing obvious, harmful error.  See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶15, 361 
P.3d 104.  As a lay witness, Ms. Mack could not offer expert opinion, unless 
“qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all 
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable statutory commands must then be 
followed with respect to that testimony.”  State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 
226, ¶ 20, 95 P.3d 1193 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702).  A trial court should 
intervene only where there is no “conceivable strategic purpose … to support the 
use of the evidence.”  State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 26, 322 P.3d 697.  Because it is 
well-settled that lay witnesses cannot provide expert opinion, and because there 
is no conceivable strategic basis why trial counsel would not object it should have 
been obvious to the trial court to intervene and exclude the evidence.  
 
7 Neither trial counsel nor Mr. Tower corrected the prosecutor’s calling him a 
psychiatrist, which unlike psychology requires a medical degree.  
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As with Ms. Mack’s testimony, trial counsel’s stipulation to Mr. Tower’s 
expert opinion relieved the State of its burden to show that his opinion would be 
helpful to the jury, that he was qualified in the methods employed, and that those 
methods are reliable.  See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14 ¶ 35.  As there was no 
evidence presented as to whether Mr. Tower had any specialized training into 
whether a patient such as David could understand certain things, trial counsel 
waived all ability to investigate and also allowed damaging testimony to be 
introduced without objection.  See, e.g., Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 36.  It was 
therefore objectively unreasonable to stipulate to the unqualified expert opinion 
of Mr. Tower.  
3. The expert testimony presented by Ms. Mack and Mr. Tower 
prejudiced Bryce. 
 
To show prejudice, Bryce must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that the deficient performance is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688, 694.  The plain error harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 
1993)).   
 Here, the State had already introduced detailed evidence through the epert 
testimony of Perrine Anderson as to David’s capacity.  The additional improper 
expert opinion testimony by two lay witnesses as to David’s capacity prejudiced 
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Bryce by lending credibility to the State’s position that David lacked capacity due 
to progressive dementia during the entire period in question, including by 
providing Ms. Mack’s unqualified expert opinion that David lacked capacity to 
sign a letter authorizing Bryce to take out loans on November 26, 2013—nearly a 
year before Ms. Mack met him.  R678-79.  She also testified that David lacked 
capacity to sign a document on January 9, 2015.  R682-83.  Mr. Tower’s 
unqualified expert opinion that David would have a hard time understanding  a 
document was likewise damaging.  R561-62.  These two opinions bolstered the 
State’s argument that Bryce was able to used David’s dementia to his advantage. 
In closing rebuttal,  the State pointed to the testimony of “professionals” to argue 
that “[t]here’s no question that this man had significant, significant dementia.”  
R896, 899.  The State added: “[T]here’s a lot of evidence, maybe too much, and 
maybe we did a little overkill, but I don’t think there’s any question about his 
level of dementia.”  R899.  
Because the State used the improper expert opinion testimony to bolster its 
case that, despite Bryce and his witness’s lay testimony, it was undisputed by 
“professionals” that David lacked capacity.  This is “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture.”  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.   
B. It was ineffective to not object to 404(b) evidence despite 




The State did not provide Bryce notice of 404(b) evidence as required by 
Rule 404(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.  R41; R375.  The trial court ruled that 
because the State did not provide notice of the 404(b) evidence, “If it is … 
evidence of other bad acts outside the scope of what’s charged in the information, 
then I will hear an argument that it’s not admissible because you didn’t give the 
404(b) notice that you were required to do because the defense asked for it and 
they were entitled to it.” R375. 
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in conformity with the character.”  Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1).  Although such 
evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, 
or lack of accident,” the prosecutor must give notice of such evidence to the 
defendant on request. See id. R. 404(b)(2).  Thus, although bad act evidence is 
admissible “to show any element of the alleged crime,” it should be excluded if 
“the sole reason it is being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a 
person acted in conformity with that character.” State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 
700 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As stated, the State introduced two key pieces of evidence of Bryce’s prior 
bad acts at trial:   
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 From December of 1998 to March of 2000, Bryce apparently took 
out loans, and there is no record of repayment.  R685-86; State’s Ex. 20.  Trial 
counsel stated he had no objection.  R686. 
 In March 2013, Bryce and David both signed the lease for the 
building where Brewhaha would be located. R735-38.  As a result of eviction 
proceedings, Bryce took David’s name off of the LLC to protect him and 
asserted that David lacked capacity to sign the lease.  R735-38, 807-08; supra 
pp. 10-11.8 
These examples of Bryce’s other acts went unchallenged by trial counsel 
despite the trial court’s ruling that it would evaluate such evidence under Rule 
404(b) and would be inclined to exclude evidence of Bryce’s other acts that fell 
outside of the timeframe for the charged conduct due to the State’s failure to give 
notice. 9 
1. It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to not object to 
the evidence of purported prior unpaid loans. 
 
                                               
8 The relevant transcript pages and exhibit are reproduced in Addendum D.  
 
9 Given the trial court’s pretrial ruling related to the 404(b) evidence, trial 
counsel should have at least held the State to its burden to show that it should be 
admitted despite not providing rule 404(b) notice, and that it would otherwise be 
admissible for a non-character purpose under the rule 403 balancing.  See, e.g., 




The evidence of apparently unpaid loans from David to Bryce from 1998 to 
2000—a decade before the charged conduct—is a quintessential example of an 
unproven allegation of prior similar conduct that is inadmissible.10  See Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) (“The 
threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence 
under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other 
than character.”); State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1978) (“The rules 
of evidence require rejection of evidence of specific behavior to prove a character 
trait except evidence of conviction of crime.”); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 
137 (Utah App. 1989) (“Evidence which goes to general disposition or that is 
unfairly prejudicial is not admissible.”).  Here, despite the trial court’s pretrial 
ruling, defense counsel inexplicably stated he had no objection to the admission 
of an unauthenticated ledger. 
There is no conceivable reason why trial counsel would argue that 404(b) 
evidence should be excluded, then stipulate to its admission particularly where 
the evidence served only to portray Bryce as having a propensity to not pay back 
his loans.  This is not a case where “defense counsel made an affirmative decision 
                                               
10 The ledger sheet titled “Loans to David Bryce Jones” is also an unauthenticated 
hearsay statement. See Utah R. Evid. 901 (requiring authentication of evidence).  
Although it is strongly insinuated from the testimony that the ledger was a 
notation of David’s loans to Bryce, there was no testimony from anyone as to who 




from the outset to utilize the 404(b) evidence to attack the State's case.  See, e.g,.  
State v. Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 697.  Rather, it is a case where trial 
counsel failed argue against the admission of damaging evidence of the same 
nature that he sought before trial to exclude.  This cannot be said to be a “sound” 
trial strategy.  See e.g. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 1136 
(objectively unreasonable to not object to argument based on previously excluded 
“inflammatory and prejudicial” evidence). 
2. It was objectively unreasonable to not object to admission of the 
lease agreement. 
 
This evidence was another example of a prior act that should have been 
subject to the trial court’s 404(b) ruling.  The State used evidence of Bryce’s 
specific behavior some six months before the charged conduct allegedly occurred 
to show that Bryce was dishonest and to generally show his bad character.   
Given the trial court’s pretrial ruling as to 404(b) evidence there was no 
conceivable basis to not object under Rules 404(b) and 608, Utah Rules of 
Evidence.11  The evidence that Bryce had previously testified that David lacked 
capacity to sign a lease well before the charged conduct occurred was particularly 
damaging to Bryce’s credibility while also allowing the State to again attack 
Bryce’s character. Again, this cannot be said to be a reasonable trial strategy 
                                               
11 Rule 608 prohibits the use of “extrinsic evidence … to prove specific instances 
of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for 
truthfulness.”    
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where trial counsel had previously sought to exclude this evidence.  See e.g. 
Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 22. 
3. Trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Bryce. 
 
To show prejudice from the 404(b) evidence, Bryce must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that the deficient performance is “sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome” considering the entire evidentiary picture.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. 12  
Here, not only did the State elicit 404(b) evidence despite the trial court’s 
pretrial ruling, it also argued in closing that Bryce had a habit of violating his 
duties to David, for example by signing a lease while incompetent: “Was he really 
looking out for his dad’s interest when he had his dad sign the lease and was he 
competent?” R876; R879 (“Having his father sign the Brewhaha lease, which is 
described as a horrible lease.”)   The State also used this evidence to attack 
Bryce’s credibility.  “The judge has instructed you.  If he lies on one occasion … 
whether he’s competent or incompetent six months later, you can disregard all of 
his testimony.”  R877. The prosecutor went on to argue that by previously arguing 
                                               
12 Given the pretrial rule 404(b) ruling, the failure by the trial court to 
intervene constituted plain error, which requires showing obvious, harmful error.  
See Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶15.   A trial court should intervene only where there is no 
“'conceivable strategic purpose' … to support the use of the evidence.”  State v. 
Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶ 26, 322 P.3d 697.  And the test for harm is the same as the 




that David was incompetent to sign the lease, Bryce had intentionally deceived 
the court—This was an intentional act to draft a pleading to tell the court of law 
that his father was incompetent.  Six months later … he testifies under oath at the 
APS hearing saying he is competent.” R877.  In rebuttal the State again used this 
evidence, “we know he lied, at least on one occasion, and that was he either lied 
when he said his father couldn’t even understand the eviction proceedings … or 
he was completely competent at the time he signed these letters in January of 
2015.”  R895.  In addition there was no limiting instruction given to direct the 
jury as to how to consider the 404(b) evidence. 
These were not “fleeting statements” and no curative instruction was given.  
See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 46, 24 P.3d 948 (testimony that victim always 
wore alarm when defendant was around was “an isolated, off-hand remark”); 
State v. Yalowski, 2017 UT App 177, ¶¶ 18, 22 (victim’s statement that defendant 
was “just constantly fighting with [her]. Getting violent” was fleeting and lacked 
detail). Rather,  the testimony was intentionally elicited by the State and changed 
the entire evidentiary picture by painting Bryce as dishonest, and by showing that 
he had a propensity to take advantage of his father through conduct that was 
virtually identical to the charged conduct.  See State v. Landon, 2014 UT App 91, 
¶ 6 (no prejudice from prior “warrant arrest, without additional information 
about the general character of the crime or the existence of a conviction”).   Here, 
the other acts evidence strongly favored the State’s version of events and painted 
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Bryce as not credible.  “[T]he possibility that [Bryce’s] conviction reflected the 
jury's assessment of his character, rather than the evidence of the crime he was 
charged with, is not insubstantial.”  Rackham, 2016 UT App 167,  ¶ 24.  Its 
admission therefore undermines confidence in the verdict.  See id.;  accord State 
v. Leber, 2010 UT App 387, ¶ 19, 246 P.3d 163 (other acts evidence prejudicial 
where it undermined defendant’s credibility and “the evidence presented at trial 
was not clearly supportive of either [the State’s or defendant’s] version of 
events”).  In sum “‘in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for” Bryce.  See State v. Rackham, 2016 
UT App 167, ¶ 24, 381 P.3d 1161 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 
(Utah 1998). 
 
C. Trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to an 
erroneous jury instruction. 
 
Where counsel stipulates to erroneous instructions, this Court will review 
them “under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine.”  State v. Malaga, 
2006 UT App 103, ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 703; accord State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 48 
(same).   To show deficient performance, Bryce must show that the jury 
instruction erroneously lowered the State’s burden of proof.  See State v. 
Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 78 (citing Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 27) (holding 
failure to object to instruction that “effectively lowered the State’s burden of proof 
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… cannot be considered reasonable trial strategy”). To show prejudice, Bryce 
must show that considering “the totality of the evidence at trial,” the “‘jury could 
reasonably have found’ the facts in [Bryce’s] favor ‘such that a failure to instruct 
the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.’” See Apodaca, 2018 UT 
App 131, ¶ 78 (quoting Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42). 
1. It was unreasonable to stipulate to Jury Instruction 31 because it 
improperly lowered the State’s burden of proof.  
 
This Court reviews “jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether 
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law.” 13 
State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quoting State v. Malaga, 
2006 UT App 103, ¶ 18, 132 P.3d 703). It is axiomatic that “our criminal code 
requires proof of mens rea for each element of a non-strict liability crime.”  State 
v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 26, 349 P.3d 676.  Thus, to accurately instruct on the 
law, jury instructions must state the mens rea that is required for each element.  
For example, a rape instruction must state the mens rea required for the element 
of sexual intercourse and for the element of nonconsent. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 
26 (quoting State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, ¶ 23, 219 P.3d 75).   Likewise, 
an instruction on second degree felony child abuse must require that the jury find 
a defendant “had the requisite intent or knowledge to cause the victim serious 
physical injury.”  See O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 41.     
                                               
13 The jury instructions are reproduced in Exhibit E. 
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Instruction No. 31 did not instruct the jury on the appropriate mental state 
because it allowed the jury to convict Bryce if it believed he acted recklessly, 
which is a lesser mental state than the knowing mental state required by statute.  
See id.   A “knowing” mental state requires that a person “is aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances” and “when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). 
A “reckless” mental state requires only that a person “is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur,” i.e. “a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as view from the 
actor’s standpoint.”  Id. § 76-2-103(3).  
As charged, the unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary statute requires 
that to be guilty, a person must: 
deal[] with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or 
property of a governmental entity, public money, or of a financial 
institution, in a manner which the person knows is a violation of the 
person’s duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property 
was entrusted.   
 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(2) (emphasis added).  Jury Instruction 31 however 
only required the knowing mental state be attached to one element: the “violation 
of the person’s duty.”   R238.  It allowed Bryce to be convicted based on mere 
reckless as to whether the alleged conduct “involves substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was 
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entrusted.”  Id.  As will be shown, a plain reading of the statute in context, along 
with the legislative intent, show that to be guilty a defendant must know that he is 
in violation of his duty and must know that his actions involve a substantial risk 
of loss to the owner or person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.      
 “‘When interpreting a statute, this court's paramount concern is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, manifested by the plain language of the 
statute.’” Utah State Eng'r v. Johnson (In re Gen. Determination), 2018 UT App 
109, ¶ 22 (quoting Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d 
666 (quotation simplified)).  The Court assumes, “‘absent a contrary indication, 
that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually 
accepted meaning,’ and [it presumes] ‘that the expression of one term should be 
interpreted as the exclusion of another" and "seek to give effect to omissions in 
statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.’” Id.  (quoting 
Aequitas Enters., LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 
923 (quotation simplified)).   The Court also reads “‘the plain language of a 
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions 
in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters.’” Id. (quoting H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 32, 203 P.3d 943). 
Here, the plain language of Section 76-6-513, when read in harmony with 
other provisions of the statute and related chapters is that the legislature 
intended for the knowing mental state to attach to the element of “involves a 
 
-32- 
substantial risk of loss.…” As stated, a fiduciary cannot be charged unless he 
handles property in such a way that he “knows is a violation of the person’s duty 
and which involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a 
person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
513. 
The “and” connects the “substantial risk of loss” element to the “violation 
of duty” element, including the knowing mental state.   When taken in the 
broader context, it becomes more clear that the legislature intended for the 
knowledge element to be imparted to the “substantial risk of loss.”  Unlawful 
dealing by a fiduciary” appears in Part 5 —the “fraud” section—of Chapter 6 of the 
Utah Criminal Code.  See § 76-6-412.  It is punished according to the theft statute, 
Utah Code Section 76-6-412.   See id.   Fraud and theft both implicate purposeful 
deprivations of property, i.e., that a defendant must know that his conduct results 
in a loss (or substantial risk of loss) to the owner.  See, e.g.,  State v. Stevens, 2011 
UT App 366, ¶ 10 (acknowledging theft by receiving requires a defendant knows 
or believes property to be stolen); State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (“The evidence must show that the defendant knew or believed the 
property was stolen and that he acted purposely to deprive the owner of 
possession of the property.”); State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, ¶ 8, 38 P.3d 
982 (reversing forgery conviction where the evidence was insufficient to show 
defendant had purpose to defraud or knowledge of facilitating fraud).  Indeed, 
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the first definition for fraud in Black’s Law Dictionary is “A knowing 
misrepresentation of the truth to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”  
Blacks Law Dict. Eighth Ed. 685 (2004) and the first definition of “theft” is “[t]he 
felonious taking and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of 
depriving the true owner of it.” Id. at 1516. That the statute does not actually 
require any loss suggests that the legislature intended a more culpable mental 
state. See, e.g., State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985) (upholding theft 
by receiving statute’s “belief” that property is probably stolen as an element, in 
part because the statute “proscribes a higher degree of misconduct. It requires 
the union of the culpable mental state and all the steps within the actor's power 
to complete the intended theft.). 
 In addition, at least one state has interpreted a statute with the same 
language to require the defendant know the substantial risk of loss be knowing.  
The New Hampshire misapplication statute to require three elements: “(1)  the 
property was entrusted to the defendant as a fiduciary; (2) the defendant dealt 
with the entrusted property in a manner which he knew constituted a breach of 
his fiduciary duty; and (3) the defendant dealt with the entrusted property in a 
manner which he knew involved a substantial risk of loss to the owner of the 
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property or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.  State v. 
Merski, 123 NH 564, 568 (NH 1983) (interpreting NH Rev. Stat. § 638:1114).   
Finally, Utah’s statute was modeled after the Model Penal Code’s parallel 
statute, section 224.13.  Although the Utah statute does not follow the Model 
Penal Code verbatim, it “remains very similar to Model Penal Code section 
224.13.”15 State v. Winward, 904 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);accord 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 195 (Utah 1987) (analyzing Model Penal Code 
commentaries where “there exists no meaningful legislative history concerning” 
the Utah Code section that was “modeled after a similar provision” of the Model 
Penal Code).   The commentary to Section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code 
stresses that it applies only to a fiduciary “who applies or disposes of entrusted 
property in a manner known to be unlawful and to involve substantial risk of loss 
or detriment to the beneficiary,” i.e. knows that the conduct is both unlawful and 
involving a substantial risk of loss.  
                                               
14 “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he deals with property that has been 
entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a financial 
institution, in a manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which 
involves substantial risk of loss to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the 
property was entrusted.” NH Rev. Stat.  § 638:11. 
 
15 “A person commits an offense if he applies or disposes of property that has 
been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a 
financial institution, in a manner which he knows is unlawful and involves 
substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to a person 
for whose benefit the property was entrusted.”  Model Penal Code of American 
Law Institute section 224.13. 
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In sum, the Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary Statute requires a knowing 
mental state as to the element of substantial risk of loss, and Jury Instruction 31 
lowered the State’s burden of proof.  It was therefore objectively unreasonable for 
trial counsel to stipulate to that instruction.  See Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 76. 
2. There is a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury 
instruction impacted the outcome. 
 
To show prejudice, Bryce must show that had a proper instruction been 
given, in the context of the “evidence before the jury and whether the jury could 
have found [that Bryce did not know of a substantial risk of loss] such that a 
failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdict.”  See 
Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42.  
Bryce was convicted of Unlawful dealing by a fiduciary based on evidence 
that he used his father’s funds to open and run a business, rather than using 
those funds to pay for the assisted living facility.  In the context of the totality of 
the evidence, the jury could have improperly convicted Bryce based on a finding 
of mere recklessness as to whether his actions cased a “substantial risk of loss or 
detriment” to David.  For example, Bryce testified that he and David both 
planned to open a restaurant together.  R806.  When the restaurant suffered a 
setback due to not getting a liquor license, Bryce attempted to salvage his father’s 
investment.  R817-18, 820-21.  Bryce’s testimony that he only did so after 
reaching an agreement with Mr. Tower for deferred payments also supported that 
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he did not know of a substantial risk of loss. R706, 823-24.  In light of these 
actions, a reasonable jury could have found that Bryce acted recklessly, but not 
knowingly.  The error therefore undermines confidence in the verdict. See 
Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 78 (quoting Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 42).  
D. Cumulative Error. 
This Court will reverse under the cumulative error doctrine “if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair 
trial was had.”  State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 73, 318 P.3d 1221 (quoting  
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)) (omission in original).  As 
stated, prejudice is shown if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 (1984).  Courts are more likely to 
reverse “‘when a conviction is based on comparatively thin evidence’” and when 
“the pivotal issue at trial was credibility of the witnesses and the errors went to 
that central issue.”  Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ¶ 73 (quoting State v. King, 
2010 UT App 396, ¶ 35, 248 P.3d 984) (additional citations omitted); accord 
State v. Havatone, 2008 UT App 133, ¶ 8, 183 P.3d 257 (“[W]hen taking [the 
errors] together, we cannot say that a fair trial was had.”). 
Here, the multiple instances of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of, 
should undermine this Court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict and require 
reversal.  The jury was required to decide whether there was evidence to support 
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a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryce’s use of David’s money to 
start their joint business constituted knowingly using David’s finances for the 
benefit of someone else, and whether in doing so, he knew there was a 
substantial risk of loss or detriment to David.  It also had to decide whether that 
same use was an unjust and improper use of David’s money for the benefit of 
someone other than David.  That decision came down to whether the jury 
believed Bryce—that David wanted to invest in the restaurant and wanted it to 
succeed, and that Bryce did everything he could to make the restaurant 
profitable for David, and did not intentionally, knowingly or recklessly place his 
father in risk.  
Trial counsel unreasonably either stipulated to or failed to object to 
evidence that corroborated the State’s case.  Despite the trial court’s ruling as to 
404(b) evidence, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the eviction 
proceedings, and Bryce’s claims in that proceeding that his father lacked 
capacity to sign a lease.  Counsel also stipulated to the admission of a ledger 
sheet that appeared to be evidence that Bryce had taken out loans from his 
father in the past without paying them back.  
Counsel also either stipulated to or failed to object to two lay witness’ 
opinion testimony that David lacked capacity—one of whom who met David only 
once offered an expert opinion as to his capacity a year before she met him and a 
few months later.   
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Finally, the erroneous jury instruction could well have misled the jury into 
convicting Bryce based on a reduced burden of proof.  
The individual and cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of Bryce’s 
trial counsel requires a reversal for a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE ABUSE OF A VULNDERABLE ADULT STATUTE IS 
NOT UNOCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
“To survive a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must ‘(1) “define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement,” and (2) “establish minimal guidelines” that 
sufficiently instruct law enforcement [so] as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”’” State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 54, 870 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 77, 137 P.3d 726; 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)); accord State v. MacGuire, 
2004 UT 4, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 1171; State v. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, P31, 57 P.3d 
977.   “A statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the 
facts of a given case.” State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854 
(emphasis added). “Where, as here, a statute ‘implicates no constitutionally 
protected conduct,’ a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge ‘only if the 
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’” MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, 
¶ 12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)).   
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“[W]hen a party raises both facial and as-applied vagueness challenges, 
"[a] court should . . . examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law."  Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 5516  (quoting Vill. of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)) 
(second alteration in original). “This is because ‘[a] plaintiff who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed [by statute] cannot complain of the vagueness 
of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’” Id. (alterations in original); 
accord United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (same). 
In reviewing such a challenge, this Court “‘presume[s] that the statute is 
valid and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.’” Murray 
City Corp. v. Robinson, 2014 UT App 107, ¶ 4, 326 P.3d 683 (quoting State v. 
Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 1218).   “It is not sufficient for the challenger to 
merely ‘inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by 
                                               
16   This issue is preserved because after briefing and argument, the trial court 
ruled that the statute was constitutional on both as applied and facial grounds.  
See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ¶¶10-12, 285 P.3d 1133 (issue preserved even 
though appellant did not fully develop it because court had opportunity to 
address it); State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ¶25 n.4, 37 P.3d 260 
(addressing identity issue even though not specifically preserved because it was 
part of the preserved probable cause issue). In the event that this Court deems 
any part of Bryce’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statute to be 
unpreserved, it may address constitutional issues not raised in the trial court 
where the defendant’s liberty is at stake.  See, e.g., State v. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1983). Finally, if trial counsel did not preserve these 
arguments, counsel’s performance falls “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” and there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694 (1984).   
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the normal reader.’” Id. (quoting Clearfield City v. Hoyer, 2008 UT App 226, ¶ 8, 
189 P.3d 94).   
  As charged, to be found guilty of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult, the jury had to find that Bryce “unjustly or improperly used or 
managed the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or benefit of someone 
other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(iii) (emphasis 
added); R237.    
The trial court ruled that subsection (iii) of the exploitation statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Bryce because a defendant 
could raise the defense that “it's not a criminal act if you do it in a just or proper 
way.”  R954.  The trial court next ruled that the terms “improper or unjust” were 
not unconstitutionally vague because they are “terms of ordinary and common 
usage, juries understand those terms,” and because there was a mens rea 
requirement–recklessness would not rise to the level of a second degree felony.  
R955-56. 
 The trial court erred in its ruling that “unjust” and “improper” limited the 
scope of who could be held culpable because the terms “unjust” and “improper” 
are subjective terms, which in the context of the broad scope of subsection (iii) of 
the statute could lead to charges against virtually anyone who uses a vulnerable 
adult’s resources for the use of anyone other than the vulnerable adult.  The 
common meaning of “improper” is “not proper; not strictly belonging, applicable, 
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correct, etc.; erroneous”; “not in accordance with propriety of behavior, manners, 
etc.”; or “unsuitable or inappropriate, as for the purpose or occasion.” 
Dictionary.com, available at www.dictionary.com/browse/improper; accord 
Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/improper (defining “improper” as “not in accord with 
fact, truth, or right procedure: INCORRECT”).  And unjust means 
“characterized by injustice: UNFAIR.”  Merriam-Webster.com, https:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unjust. Both of these terms have very 
subjective meanings.  For example, if a jury found mere criminal negligence in a 
single poor investment decision, it could convict a defendant based on that 
conduct. Or, if one child asked a vulnerable adult child for help with paying 
college tuition or purchasing a home from a vulnerable adult where that child’s 
sibling had received no such assistance, such conduct could be seen as unfair or 
unjust use of the vulnerable adult’s resources.  
Other states have found similar language to be problematic.  For example, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the definition of exploitation as “the 
illegal or improper use of a vulnerable person or his resources for another's profit 
or advantage, with or without the consent of the vulnerable adult” was 
problematic, in part because of the undefined term “improper use.” Colburn v. 
State, 201 So. 3d 462, 466-67 (Miss. 2016) (quoting Decker v. State, 66 So.3d 654 
(Miss. 2011)).  The Court reasoned that “a vulnerable adult cannot give a spouse 
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permission to withdraw money from a checking account to buy herself a birthday 
present; or give one of her children or grandchildren permission to withdraw 
money to pay college tuition. … [B]oth these actions would constitute crimes.” Id. 
(quoting Decker, 66 So.3d 654).  A statutory amendment that defined both 
“illegal use” and “improper use” cured the facial vagueness problem with the 
statute.  Id. at 469.  Likewise the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Fla. Code § 
415.111(5), which bars knowingly or willfully “exploit[ing] an aged person or 
disabled adult by the improper or illegal use or management of the funds, assets, 
property, power of attorney, or guardianship of such aged person or disabled 
adult for profit,” was unconstituationally vague.  Cuda v. State, 639 So. 2d 22, 23 
& n.1 (Fla. 1994).  This was because the statue provided “no clear explanation of 
the proscribed conduct, no explicit definition of terms, nor any good faith 
defense.” Id. at 25. 
In contrast, Delaware’s similar statute which defined exploitation as "the 
illegal or improper use or abuse of an infirm person, his resources or his rights, 
by another person, whether for profit or other advantage" was not deemed 
unconstitutional. See State v. Sailer, 684 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Del.1994) (quoting 31 
Del.C. § 3902(5) (1974)).  That Court ruled that the exploitation statute had clear 
intent language that recognized adults with physical or mental infirmity were 
“‘subject to psychological or physical injury or exploitation’” and that the 
“General Assembly, therefore, intends through this chapter to establish a system 
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of services for impaired adults designed to protect their health, safety and 
welfare.’”  Id. (quoting Del. Code. Ann. Title 1250, § 3901).   
As with the Mississippi and Florida statutes, Utah’s statute could be read 
so broadly as to criminalize gifts from a vulnerable adult’s spouse to their child 
because such gift would not be used for the vulnerable adult’s benefit and could 
also be seen as improper, particularly if one sibling does not agree with a gift to 
another sibling.  Likewise, a good faith investment decision that turns out to be 
unwise in retrospect could easily be seen as “improper,” and would also not 
benefit the vulnerable adult.  Unlike the Delaware statute, Utah’s has no clear 
legislative intent.  Also, unlike the Delaware statute, it does not modify 
“improper” with “illegal,” a term with a more definite common meaning, which 
when read in conjunction with “improper” and the indictment put defendants on 
notice as to what conduct was proscribed. See Sailer, 684 A.2d  at 1250 (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 747 (6th ed. 1990) as defining “illegal” as “against or not 
authorized by law,” and quoting the American Heritage Dictionary 909 (3rd ed. 
1992) as defining “improper” as “not in keeping with accepted standards of what 
is right . . . often referring to unethical conduct” ).  
The trial court erred in its reasoning because it found that by including the 
terms “improper” and “unjust” as a perquisite for making a person’s conduct 
illegal, the legislature provided a defense.  The problem with this reasoning is 
that–as the Mississippi and Florida courts noted—the limiting words are highly 
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subjective.  Indeed, subsection (iii) under which Bryce was charged appears to be 
a catch-all, as unlike the other subsections, it does not require the person charged 
to have any position of trust, any legal authority to act on behalf of the vulnerable 
adult or any knowledge of the vulnerable adult’s incapacity to consent.  See 
generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(i)-(v).  Although other terns such as 
“position of trust” are defined, unjustly and unknowingly are not.  Id. §76-5-
111(1).  Indeed, even subsection (iv) at least limits the exploitation to misuse to 
someone with legal authority and subsection (i) to require a “position of trust.”17  
The failure to provide any limits to what conduct is prohibited fails to provide 
notice as to what conduct is prohibited, and could lead to arbitrary enforcement.  
For example, a spouse could become liable, even if acting without any knowledge 
as to the vulnerable adult’s capacity, based only on criminal negligence.  See id. § 
76-5-111(4)(b).  Thus, not only could the spouse of a vulnerable adult find herself 
guilty for using “resources” of the vulnerable adult to pay college tuition for her 
child, the child who receives the gift, i.e. the person who “uses” the resources 
could also face criminal culpability.  If a vulnerable adult purchased a car for his 
child, the salesperson could face criminal culpability. 
The statute is also vague as applied to Bryce because he was not put on 
notice as to what conduct of his was prohibited as a lay person rather than as a 
                                               
17 Bryce was originally charged under subsection (4)(a)(i), but the information 
was later amended to subsection 4(a)(iii).   
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fiduciary, nor was he put on notice with regard to any lay activity what conduct  
constituted “improper or unjust” use or management of David’s resources.  As a 
result, this Court should reverse Bryce’s conviction on the basis that the 
exploitation of a vulnerable adult statute is unconstitutionally vague both as 
applied to him and facially. 
 
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT 
TO CONVICT MR. JONES OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT  
 “A defendant must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show 
that the trial court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict.” State v. 
Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶27, 345 P.3d 1168. When reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court does “‘not sit as a second fact finder.’” SSalt Lake City v. 
Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶ 10, 342 P.3d 212 (quoting State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 
1150 (Utah 1991)).  This Court views “the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom … ‘in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict.’” Id. (quoting Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150).   This Court “will overturn a 
conviction only if the evidence ‘is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a 
jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.’” Id. 
(quoting Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150); accord State v. Thompson, 2017 UT App 
183, ¶ 33, 405 P.3d 892 (quoting State v. Ring, 2013 UT App 98, ¶ 2, 300 P.3d 
1291) (“‘So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
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which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops.’”).18  
As charged, to convict Bryce of unlawful dealing by a fiduciary, the jury had 
to find that he knew the he had violated his fiduciary duty and that the breach 
involved a substantial risk of loss.  To convict Bryce of exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult, the State had to prove that Bryce unjustly or improperly used or 
managed the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of 
someone other than the vulnerable adult.  To carry his burden of persuasion on a 
claim of insufficient evidence, Bryce may marshal the evidence that supports the 
verdict, and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict.  See Utah R. App. P. 24 2017 advisory 
committee note (citing State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645).  The evidence 
presented at trial that supported the State’s case as to Bryce’s knowledge that he 
breached his duty and/or that he improperly used or managed David’s resources 
for the benefit of someone else, is as follows: 
1. Bryce used David’s money to fund the restaurant and did not make regular 
payments to Highland Cove from December 2013 to May 2014.  
2. Cody Tower did not recall the arrangement with Bryce to defer payments.  
                                               
18 This issue was preserved. See Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 
1168 (“When the specific ground for an objection is clear from its context, the 
issue is preserved for appeal.”).  To the extent it was not preserved, it may be 




3. Heather Knight testified that she left messages for Bryce about payment 
once a month.  R523. 
4. Highland Cove sent Bryce an eviction notice on May 23, 2014. R521. 
Even if all the marshaled facts are true they do not support that Bryce knew 
he was breaching his duty or otherwise improperly or unjustly managing his 
father’s finances.  Nor does it support that he knowingly created a substantial risk 
of loss.  Instead, ample evidence supports that Bryce was trying to help his father 
have a successful and profitable restaurant business, and while doing so believed 
that his actions were authorized by the power of attorney and by David’s desire 
for the restaurant to succeed.  In doing so, Bryce was not acting in the interest of 
anyone but his father.   
There is also no evidence that there was ever an actual substantial risk of loss.  
Although the retirement home threatened eviction, testified that the home could 
not evict David.  R523.  Thus, there was no substantial risk that David would 
actually be evicted, i.e. suffer actual loss.     
The evidence is therefore insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on this 
count.  See Miles, 2014 UT 47, ¶ 28 (The evidence presented on the first factor 
did not demonstrate, nor did it give rise to a reasonable inference, that Mr. 
Miles's knife bore the character of a dangerous weapon as evidenced by any 
inherent and uniquely weapon-like traits.”).  
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IV. TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY BY NOT 
ARGUING FOR MERGER OF BRYCE’S CONVICTIONS 
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions protect against twice 
punishing a person for the same offense.  U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. 
I., sec. 12.  “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance where ‘a 
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts to only one 
offense’” by requiring the court to merge two convictions for the same offense 
into one.  sec. 12. “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance where ‘a 
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts to only 
one offense’” by requiring the Court to merge two convictions for the same 
offense into one. sec. 12. “The doctrine of merger seeks to avoid a circumstance 
where ‘a criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts 
to only one offense’” by requiring the Court to merge two convictions for the 
same offense into one. State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, ¶ 8, 344 P.3d 191 
(quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 31, 128 P.3d 1179). 19   Thus, “when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act 
shall be punishable under only one such provision.”  Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(1).  “If trial counsel fails to request the consolidation of charges under 
the merger doctrine, and consolidation would be in order, trial counsel has failed 
                                               
19 State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064, overruled the common law merger 
doctrine, including the Finlayson-Lee test.  
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to provide effective assistance of counsel.”   State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 
71, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 864 (citing State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶¶ 24-26, 994 P.2d 
1243; State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 
236, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
Generally, the merger doctrine applies to prevent punishment for both 
lesser included offenses and greater offenses.  Under this analysis, the Court first 
determines “whether the lesser offense is ‘established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.’”  
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96, 98 (Utah 1983)) “If the the two crimes are ‘such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,’ then the lesser 
offense ‘merges into the greater crime and the State cannot convict and punish 
the defendant for both offenses.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 674 P.2d at 98) (additional 
citation omitted); accord State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶ 10, 71 P.3d 624.  
Although “comparison of the statutory elements” is generally sufficient, in cases 
where “the two crimes have multiple variations,” the Court looks beyond the 
statutory elements to “consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-
lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually 
proved at trial." Id. (quoting Baker, 674 P.2d at 97).  
For example, in Ross, the defendant was convicted of both communications 
fraud and forgery for a single course of conduct that involved cashing forged 
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checks.  R237.  This Court determined that Ross’s forgery convictions merged 
with his communications fraud conviction under Utah Code Section 76-1-402(3) 
because there was no separate factual basis for the convictions, particularly 
where the jury was never asked to find a “communication” separate from passing 
a forged check.  See Ross, 951 P.2d at 245.  “On the facts of this case, only element 
two of communications fraud ("communication" to another person) and element 
two of forgery ("utterance" of a forged check) are potentially independent of each 
other” requiring merger “unless the jury was instructed on and the State proved 
separate factual bases for the elements of ‘utterance’ and ‘communication.’” Id.  
at 242.  This Court therefore ruled merger was appropriate because “the only 
theory the State actually put before the jury” did not distinguish between 
“communication” and “utterance,” instead arguing that “the communication is 
the check itself.”  Id.  at 245.  Likewise, in State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ¶ 27, 
989 P.2d 1065, the Supreme Court  ruled that possession of controlled substance 
was a lesser included offense of operating a methamphetamine laboratory where 
“no special verdict form was employed” and it was possible the jury relied on 
overlapping elements to convict.  In contrast, merger is not required where there 
is independent evidence to support both convictions.  See, e.g.,  State v. Yanez, 
2002 UT App 50, ¶ 21, (convictions for witness tampering and discharge of 
firearm did not merge where there “was evidence other than the discharge of the 
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firearm upon which the jury could base defendant’s conviction for witness 
tampering”). 
Here, although the two statutes under which Bryce was convicted are 
typically separate offenses, the State’s theory of the case provided no factual 
distinction between the two charges.  Bryce was charged with two separate 
felonies for one course of conduct, both of which have multiple variations. Under 
Section 76-6-513(2), “[a] person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a 
fiduciary if the person deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a 
fiduciary … in a manner which the person knows is a violation of the person's 
duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a 
person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.”  Under Utah Code Section 
76-5-111(4)(iii), “[a] person commits the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable 
adult when the person … unjustly or improperly uses or manages the resources of 
a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of someone other than the 
vulnerable adult.”   
Although the State charged Bryce with violating both statutes, the elements 
overlap, particularly under the only theory advanced by the State—that Bryce 
purportedly used his fiduciary position to use his father’s money for a purpose 
other than caring for his father.  See Ross, 951 P.2d at 285.  There was no 
separate factual basis for each either conviction.  See id. The State  apparently 
originally charged Bryce under subsection (4)(a)(i) of the exploitation of a 
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vulnerable adult statute, which required a “position of trust” but later amended to 
subsection (4)(a)(iii).  See R135 (Third amended information incorrectly stating 
that a “position of trust and confidence” is required under subsection 4(a)(iii)).  
The information did not differentiate between what conduct constituted unlawful 
dealing by a fiduciary but not exploitation of a vulnerable adult or vice versa. 
R169-70 (Fourth Amended Information).  In arguing for a conviction on both 
counts the State never argued that any of Bryce’s conduct violated only one of the 
charged crimes.  See, e.g., R897 (arguing that the power of attorney created “a 
legal duty … a fiduciary duty” and tying that duty to David’s capacity).  The 
elements in this case thus overlap under the only theory advanced by the State. 
The first element of Section 76-6-513, dealing “with property that has been 
entrusted to him as a fiduciary in a manner which the person knows deals with 
property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary … in a manner which the 
person knows is a violation of the person's duty” overlaps with “unjustly or 
improperly us[ing] or manag[ing] the resources of a vulnerable adult.”  Because 
the mismanagement alleged involved Bryce’s fiduciary duty to David, once the 
jury determined that Bryce had knowingly violated his duty, it would necessarily 
determine that he unjustly or improperly used or managed David’s resources.  
Likewise, once the jury determined there was a “substantial risk of loss” to David, 
it would necessarily determine that the resources were managed for the 
advantage of someone else.  The only independent elements were the finding of 
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“vulnerable adult” and “fiduciary duty” but as stated, the State’s theory tied the 
fiduciary duty to managing the resources, and it argued that Bryce was only able 
to breach his duties because David was a vulnerable adult.  See id.   
Thus, as in Ross, Bryce’s convictions should be merged because the State 
alleged just one course of conduct and did not argue that any of Bryce’s conduct 
violated one statute but not the other.  Trial counsel’s failure to argue for merger 
was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Bryce respectfully requests that his convictions be 
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with prejudice.  Bryce 
alternatively Bryce requests that the convictions against him be reversed and that 
this Court remand his case for a new trial.  Alternatively, Bryce requests that that 
Court remand with an order to the trial court to merge his convictions.  
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